AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. vs. DUNLEVI ET AL.

that while in transit the old domicil remains. This was a question
arising in reference to the right of taxation, and it was held that
for such a purpose he was to be deemed an inhabitant of the
original domicil, and was liable to taxation there. In a previous
case, however, also in Maine, 15 Maine Rep. 58, Exeter vs.
Brighton, the court took a distinction between home in respect to
settlement, and domicil in its broadest sense, holding that the
former ceased upon abandonment, although no new home was at
A. D.
once acquired.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Supreme Court of Indiana.
THE AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. V8. DUNLEVY AND OTHERS.
1. An express cbmpany contracted with the holder, in Indiana, to present a bill
of exchange, drawn and indorsed by parties in that state, and accepted payable
in New York. The bill was placed in the hands of a competent notary in New
York a day before its maturity, and was, on that day, presented and protested,
whereby the indorsers were discharged. On suit brought against the, express
company for their neglect, it was urged that the contract of the company was
performed, when the bill was put into the notary~s hands. This question
examined, but not decided.
2. The express company, by delivering the bill to the notary on the day before its
-maturity, had made that officer their agent to hold and collect the paper. This
employment had nothing to do with the notary's official character; it was not
of necessity, but of the company's choice and for its convenience; it was
attended with its risks, which must be borne by the party whose convenience is
looked to in the employment. On this ground the express company is held
liable.
8. The measure of damages is the face of the bill and interest.

The facts of the case are set forth in the opinion of the court,
which was delivered by
PERKINS, J.-On the 25th of October 1857, Dunlevy, Haire &
Co., of Indianapolis, Indiana, owned and possessed a bill of ex-
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change, drawn by R. A. Douglas, indorsed by Blake and Van
Blaricum, and accepted by P. A. Douglas, 309 Broadway, New
York, for $5000. The last day of grace for payment of the bill
was November 6th, 1857.
On the 25th of October 1857, the American Express Company
received the above described bill from Dunlevy, Haire & Co., at
Indianapolis, in the capacity of agents, to collect it for a reasonable compensation, and return the proceeds to the holder of the
bill at Indianapolis. The Company took the bill to New York, and,
on the 5th of November, placed it in the hands of a respectable
notary for demand and protest. The notary demanded payment
and protested the paper on that day, and no other demand was ever
made. The demand and protest should have been made on the 6th
of November. The Company never collected the bill; the indorsers,
then solvent, were discharged by the carelessness of the notary.
The drawer and acceptor are insolvent.
Dunlevy, Haire & -Co. now sue the Express Company for the
amount of the bill, and they recovered below.
The main question in the cause is, did the Express Company
become liable to the holders for the amount of the bill on account
of the failure to demand its payment on the proper day ? We say
this is the real question, because, if the Express Company became
liable by that failure, we do not see that the delay of the holders
to sue upon that liability, or their attempt to get their money on
the bill from the endorsers, has extinguished that liability: See
Ed. on Bills, 405. If the bill was not one requiring protest,-not
one requiring the services of a notary, then, as all agree, the notary
can be regarded as simply the agent of the Express Company, and
that Company as liable for his negligence. The bill in question
was drawn in one state, payable in another. The great weight of
authority certainly is, that a foreign bill must be protested by a
notary, if one be convenient, if not, then by persons present : 1
Par. on Notes and Bills, pp. 358, 633, and 642; 2 Id. 328; Miltenberger vs. Spaulding, 33 Mo. 421; The State Bank vs. Hayes,
3 Ind. 400. In those states, then, that hold a bill drawn in one
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state of the Union on a person in another to be completely a foreign
bill, it would follow that a notarial protest would, as the general
rule, be required.
Taking it for granted, then, for the purposes of this case, that
the bill before us is a foreign one, and required a notarial protest,
and a notary having, in fact, been employed, is the Express Company liable for his negligence ? Or did the liability of that Company cease when it delivered the bill, at the proper time, &c., to a
competent notary, supposing the delivery was thus made in this
case ?
Upon this question the authorities are in conflict. One division
of the authorities holds that a notary is a public officer, whom all
may or must employ, and who is alone answerable for his own
negligence to the injured party. But the New York authorities,
and those in some other states, are different. Says Mr. Parsons,
in his late work on Notes and Bills, Vol. I., p. 480: "The
authorities are not uniform on this question; some hold the bank,
or other agent, liable for the proper conduct of the notary employed ; and those which hold the bank discharged by due care in
selection of the notary seem to apply the same rule to any person
selected with due care as a competent agent."
Chancellor KENT, in his Commentaries, Vol. 3, p. 94, of the 6th
edition, and p. 128, of the 10th edition, in a note says: " In South
Carolina the rule of law is in conformity with that declared in New
York, and a bank who receives a note for collection, is liable for
any neglect by which the indorsers are discharged. The use of
the moneys collected is deemed a sufficient consideration for the
undertaking. The bank (or other agent, the Express Company
for example) must, therefore, see to the demand of payment of the
maker, and to the giving of due notice of non-payment to the
indorsers. If the note be placed in the hands of a notary, be is
to be regarded as the agent of the bank, for whose neglect ncd
mistakes the bank is liable: Thompson vs. The Bank of South
Carolina, 3 Hill's S. C. Rep. 77." In. Hoard vs. Garner, 3
Sandf. (N. Y.) Rep. 179, the New York doctrine is stated thus, by
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Judge SANDFORD : " The principle established by Allen vs. The
Merchants' Bank, 22 Wend. 215, was, that the implied contract
of the banker was an undertaking to do the thing itself, and was
not the delegation of an agent or authority to procure the thing to
be done; that the contract looked mainly to the thing to be done,
and his undertaking was for the due use of all proper means for
its performance ; that it was not a contract only for the immediate
service of the agent and his acting faithfully as the representative
of his principal. That in the latter case, the responsibility ceases
with the limits of the personal service undertaken; in the other
it extends to cover all the necessary and proper means for the
accomplishment of the object, by whomsoever used or employed."
For later New York cases, see 3 Selden 459; Edwards on Bills,
pp.'112, 402, 403, and 476.
Ohio follows the line of these decisions: Reeves, Stephens &' Co.
vs. The State Bank of Ohio, 8 Ohio St. Rep. 465.
Indiana has followed the same line of decisions, as applicable to
banks: Tyson vs. The State Bank of Indiana, 6 Blkfd. 225; and
as applicable to attorneys: Abbott and Others vs. Smith, 4 Ind.
452. The question as to the applicability of the doctrine to a
notary has not arisen in this state ; nor do we think it now arises.
The Express Company did not, in this case, deliver the bill to the
notary at the proper time. We think the negligence in this case
is chargeable to the Express Company. That Company did not
limii themselves in the use of the notary to his official functions;
and their own act, in prematurely placing the bill in his hands,
tenled to mislead him. If the Company had retained the bill till
the hour of presentment for payment, then accompanied the notary
to the place of demand, or, even if they had not accompanied
him, a premature presentment would not have been made. See 4
Wharton (Penn.) Rep. 113; 18 Penn. St. Rep. 263; 21 Id. 506.
On this point, we adopt the language of Judge RAY, who decided
the case below.
It was clearly the duty of the Express Company to convey the
bill to New York, and, at the proper time add place, to present
the same and demand payment thereof. It was their duty to re.
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tan the custody of said bill and control of the same. If payment
was refused, they should cause the same to be duly protested and
notice given. It cannot be insisted that because the acceptor
might not pay the bill, therefore the Express Company were not
required to present it and demand its payment. The acceptor
might, and the presumption in such case is, that he will pay upon
demand; and if without any demand the bill be given to a notary
and he collects and retains the proceeds, the Express Company
could not evade responsibility for the default of the officer. It
would have been a case in which the employment of a sub-agent is
not required. The notary is not, by virtue of his office, a collector ; and if he were, the defendants are the collecting agents
selected by the plaintiffs. If the notary, having possession of the
bill the day before it was due, had negotiated the same, it is clear
the defendants would have been liable. The bill was intrusted to
their custody, and, unless there be a necessity for the transfer of that
custody, it cannot be lawfully changed. Did that necessity exist?
Certainly it did not at the time it was made, and it is not clear but
that such delivery of the bill to the notary, the day before it became payable, followed as it was by a protest upon the same day,
was the immediate cause of the default. But a review of the duties
of a notary may furnish a still more satisfactory answer to the inquiry. The peculiar province of this officer is to furnish eVidence.
His certificate and seal are received as proof of the fact of the presentment of bills of exchange for acceptance or payment. He is
not, either at common law or by statute, made the custodian'of the
paper, but simply the witness to attest and prove the act performed
in his presence or under his eye. The bond he gives is but nominal,
and the law does not require that papers of such value shall be
placed in his absolute, uncontrolled charge. He is not like a sheriff,
who is the custodian of the writ he executes, and who makes his return upon that writ. The one is an officer of the law having charge
of the thing itself, with power to enter thereon his doings and retain the possession thereof and return the same into court. The
other is but a witness to attest what is done, and perhaps by another,
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in his presence, having no power over the paper presented and no
legal right to its custody or control. It is convenient, doubtless,
to transfer the possession of the paper to the notary, to hunt up
the acceptor and make demand, but this convenience is accompanied
by its risk, and the risk not being absolutely necessary, must be
assumed by the party who voluntarily incurs it on account of it:
convenience.
It is said the recovery below was too large, interest having been
allowed on the bill from maturity. Less than that sum would not
have been recovered in a suit on the bill against the indorsers, had
they not been discharged by the negligence of the Express Company. Says Edwards on Bills 405: " Where a bank with whom a
note is deposited for collection fails to take the proper steps to
charge the drawer or indorsers, in consequence of which the holder
is unable to collect the amount of the bill, the measure of damages
is the face of the bill, with interest." See also Sedgwick on Dam.,
353, citing Walker vs. Smith, 4 Dall. 389.
The judgment below is affirmed, with one per cent. damages and
costs.
For the foregoing case, which discusses several interesting questions, we
are indebted to the courtesy of J. D.
Howland, Esq., of Indianapolis.
L That the general law merchant requires a notarial protest of a foreign
bill i6 not questioned: Story on Bills,
277; Parsons on Notes, &o., 642; and
the expression in the principal case,
therefore, that "the great weight of
authority" is so, is scarcely as strong
as it might be.
Il.It has been the subject of considerable doubt and discussion, whether
or not a bill drawn in one state but payable in another, is to be considered as a
foreign bill. Chancellor KENT, however, says the weight of authority is
thai it is foreign: 8 Kent's Com. 94 n.,
and Justice STORY considers that it
-is now well established:" Story on

Bills of Exch., 23, in which Mr. PARsoNs coincides: 1 Parsons on Notes,
&c., 642 n. This is also in analogy to
the English doctrine, which holds a bill
drawn in Ireland or Scotland on England a foreign bill: Chitty on Bills 10.
III. The most important point, however, that the principal case raises, is in
regard to the liability of persons re
ceiving bills on deposit for the acts of
their agents or correspondents, and upon this point the decisions are very contradictory. The question has usually
arisen between the depositors of the bills
and banks, and in this aspect we shall
consider it.
1. The leading case for the doctrine
which exampts the bank from liability
is Bellemire vs. The Bank of United
States, 1 Miles 173, decided by the
District Court of Philaudelphia in 1836
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and affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in 1839 (4 Wharton 105).
The reasons assigned in the opinion of
the former court by STnouD, J., are very
clearly stated, and appear to cover the
entire ground. The bank was held not
liable, because the implied contract on
the reception of a note on deposit, is to
put it in the usual course of collection,
and the custom of banks is to hand the
note to a notary if not paid during
banking hours. If the bank had employed its own agent or clerk it would
have been liable for his negligence, because that would not have been the
customary mode of collecting. And, in
the Supreme Court, in affirmingthe judgment, GIBsoN, C. J., added, that the
custom of the bank being known, the
depositor should have made a special
contract if he desired any special mea6
sures taken. And in Mechanics' Bank
vs. Earp, 4 Rawle 884, ROGES, J., expressly and pointedly says: "the basis
of the opinion of the court is, that the
bank was an agent for the tranmission
of the bills,'* that being the contract
implied by custom; and goes on to say,
that if the jury on the second trial
should find a special contract to collect,
a different case will be presented. So
in Wingate vs. Mechanics' Bank, 10
Barr 104, the bank was held liable on
the ground that the jury had found the
contract to be express for the collection
of the note.
These decisions have been followed,
though not always upon grounds as
clearly stated, or as tenable, in the following states: Connecticut, East Haddam Bank vs. Scovil, 12 Conn. 803,

part of the bank was only to transmit:
s. F. also Lawrence vs. Stonington Bank,
6 Conn. 521 ; Massachusetts, Fabens vs.
Mercantile Bank, 23 Pick. 830, Dorchester, &c. Bank vs. New England Bank,
1 Cush. 177, and Warren Bank vs. Suffolk Bank, 10 Id. 582; Maryland, Jackson vs. Union Bank, 6 Harr. & Johns.
146, which, however, was a case of a
person, not a banker, undertaking to
collect a bill aa an accommodation for a
customer, and sending it to a bank for
that purpose, and was decided on the
general ground that the agent used ordinary care and diligence: Citizens"
Bank vs. Howell etca., 8 Md. 530; Mississippi, Tiernan et al. vs. Commercial
Bank, 7 How. Miss. Rep. 648; Agricultural Bank vs. Commercial Bank, 7 Sm.
& M. 592; Bowling vs. Arthur, 84 Miss.
41; Louisiana, Hyde et al. vs. Planters'
Bank, 17 La. 560; Baldwin vs. Bank of
Louisiana, 1 La. Ann. 13; and the point
was mentioned in the Supreme Court
of the United States, in Bank of Washington vs. Triplett et al., 1 Pet. 25, but
not decided, as it seems to have been
conceded in that case, that the bank received the note expressly for raosmiaaon only.
2. On the other hand, in some states
the bank is held liable for all the acts
and omissions of the other bank, fiotary,
or other agent to whom it delivers the
note. The question arose in the Supreme
Court of New York, 1836, Allen vs. Merchants' Bank, 15 Wendell 482, and was
there decided in accordance with the
doctrine already enunciated in Bellemire
vs. Bank of United States. But in the
same case in 1839, 22 Wendell 215, the
where HUNTINGTON, J., argues, that it Court of Appeals reversed the decision
was necessary the bill should be pre- of the Supreme Court by a vote of foursented at another place, and this must teen senators against the chancellor and
have been known to the depositor, and, nine senators, who were in favor of aftherefore, the implied contract on the firmance. This case, though decided by
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so divided a court, is the leading case
on this side of the question, and not
only settled the law of New York, but
has been approved and followed in other
states. The argument of VERPLANCK,
Sen., which may be considered the opinion of the court, endeavors to show that
the case does not differ from the ordinary ones, in which the maxim respondeat superior applies, and that there is
no real difference between receiving a
bill for collection in the same place and
in a distant place. It had already been
decided in McKinster vs. Bank of Utica,
9 Wend. 46, s. c. in Court of Appeals,
11 Id. 473, that the bank is responsible
where the jury had found that it received the note for collection, and the
real point decided in Allen vs. Merchants' Bank, is, that the implied contract of a bank receiving a note payable
in a distant place is to collect, and,
therefore, that it is responsible for all
the acts of its agents or correspondents.
This is the only real difference between
the decisions in Pennsylvania and New
York, and the states which follow them
respectively.
In Bank of Orleans vs. Smith, 3 Hill
N. Y. 560, the Supreme Court, yielding
as little as possible of its former opinion,
explained Allen vs. Merchants' Bank,
and held, that both the transmitting and
the collecting banks were agents of the
depositor of the note; and, therefore,
liable to him; but the Court of-Appeals
disapproved this case, and held in Montgomery Co. Bank vs. Albany City Bank,
8 Selden 459 (reversing s. c. 8 Barbour
896), that the second bank, or individual
employed to collect, is the agent only
of the first bank, and responsible solely
to it. And in Commercial Bank vs.
Union Bank, 1 Kern. 203 (1854), ALLEN,
J., says the liability of the first or receiving bank "is no longer an open
qaestion."
VOL. XII-18

Similar decisions have been made in
South Carolina, Thompson vs. Bank of
the State, 3 Hill S. C. 77; Ohio, Reeves
et al. vs. State Bank, 8 Ohio State Rep.
465, and this would appear to be the law
in Indiana, Tyson vs. State Bank, 6
Blackf. 225, Abbott et al. vs. Smith, 4
Ind. 452; though the question does not
seem to have arisen in the case of a
bank sending a bill to a distant place
for collection. The law in England also
appears to have been settled in the same
way: Van Wart vs. Woolley el al., 3
Barn. & Cress. 439 (10 E. C. L. R. 204);
Mackersy vs. Ramsays et al., 9 CL &
Finn. 818.
3. In some of the earlier cases the
question was raised, whether there.is
any consideration on account of which
the bank can be held liable, but in
Smedes vs. Utica Bank, 20 Johns. 372, it
was held that the use of the money, as a
deposit from the time of payment of the
note till the depositor draws it out, is a
sufficient consideration, and this view
has been generally followed.
4. Much endeavor has been made to
establish a distinction between the cases
of bills payable where the bank is, and
those payable in a distant place, but
there does not appear to be any foundation in principle for such distinction,
and the fact is only important as evidence of the implied contract.
5. The question has not often arisen
between parties other than banks and
depositors, but the increasing amount
of such business done by other persons,
especially express companies, is likely
to raise important questions as to how
far the principles applied to banks may
be modified by contact with different
rights, obligations, and customs.
6. As the result of the foregoing examination, it may be stated that the
question narrows itself down to one of
implied contract, whether by the recep-
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tion of a bill on deposit, the bank undertakes to collect, and thus becomes liable
for the acts of those by whom it performs
the collection, or the undertaking is
only to put the bill in the ordinary course
of collection, in which case the bank is
responsible only for want of due care in.
the selection of such sub-agents as are
customarily employed in such business.
IV. It follows necessarily from the
doctrine which exempts the transmitting
bank from responsibility, except for its
own want of care or good faith, that the
bank, notary, or person to whom the
bill is sent, becomes the agent of the
holder and responsible directly to him;
but some important questions have
arisen in cases where the second bank
has considered and treated the remitting bank as the owner of the bill, as to
the right of the second bank against the
owner to retain the proceeds in satisfaction of debts due by the remitting bank.
The decisions may be stated as establishing, that if the collecting bank bon4
fide considers the remitting bank as the
owner, and actually makes advances, or
allows balances to rethain, or does some
similar act on the faith of the receipts or
anticipated receipts from the bill, it will
be entitled to retain the proceeds even
against the real owner of the bill.
But both the belief and the act must
concur-neither by itself will give any
title: Bank of Metropolis vs. New England Bank, 6 How. U. S. Rep. 212;
Jones et al. vs. Milliken et al., 5 Wright
(41 Penn. State) 252; McBride vs.
Farmers' Bank, 25 Barbour 657 ; Reeves
et al. vs. State Bank, 8 Ohio State Rep.
465.
V. The cases so far have been discussed as questions of implied contract
and of agency, but they do not all rest
clearly and squarely upon that ground.
In some of them the reasons of the de-

cision are not very apparent, and in not
a few, the position is more or less definitely assumed, that a bank is not liable
for the negligence of a notary employed
by it.
This question is discussed though not
decided by the principal case. Accurately stated the question is, whether a
notary is a public officer in such a sense
as will exonerate a party employing
him from liability for his negligence, in
a case where the principal would certainly be liable, if the person he employed were not a notary.
We do not find any case in which this
point has been fairly met and decided,
but we say this is the real question,
because if the decision is upon a custom,
then it would be the same if custom had
pointed out any other person as the
proper one to be employed, and if it be
upon the ground, as it is in some cases,
that a notary is primd facie a proper
person for a careful agent to select for
certain busifiess, then the only difference
in employing another person, would be
the burden of proof that he was a competent and proper person for the work.
Certain officers, such as the mail carriers, the sheriff, &c., are public in such
sense, that a person employing them in
a case within their functions is ieleased
immediately from all further liability,
which is transferred directly to the officer. Is a notary such public officer?
In Allen v's. Merchants' Bank, 22
Wendell 215, VERnPLANOX,

Sen.,

dis-

cusses this question, and intimates his
doubt whether the bank would be liable,
if the negligence was in the performance
of a duty strictly official, which could
only be performed by some notary, but
then proceeds to show that the point
did not necessarily arise in that case.
And in Smedes vs. Bank of Utica, 20
Johns. 872, there is a dictum of Wou-
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woRTH, J., that "if the note had been
delivered to a notary it would present a
different case. Notaries are officers appointed by the state; confidence is placed
in them by the government;" but he
proceeds to show, that this would be
evidence to justify an agent in selecting
them for certain business, and the
reasoning would seem to apply to any
agent selected with due care.
In. Hyde vs. Planters' Bank, 17 La.
560, some stess is laid on the fact that
the notary is an independent sworn
officer, and in Baldwin vs. Bank of Louisiana, 1 La. Ann. 13, it is said, that the
notary is a public officer, "whose official
character implies a certain degree of
skill and experience," but the decision
is expressly rested on the implied authority to employ a sub-agent, citing
Story on Agency, J 201.
In Governor, to use, &c. vs. Gordon,
16 Ala. 72, the question was upon a
statute of Alabama, that no action "shall
be maintained against the sureties of any
sheriff, constable, or otherpublic officer of
this state," &c., unless commenced within
six years. The action was against the
sureties of a notary, and the court held
that the notary was a "public officer,"
within the statute. See also Citizens'
Bank. vs. Howell et aL., S Md. 530.
From these, which are the principal
cases on the subject, it appears, that the
point as stated above has never been
decided in this eountiy, and has not
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even been fairly stated except by VERPLANCK, Sen., in Allen vs. Merchants'

Bank. That able and profound jurist
intimates his opinion, that the notary
alone is responsible for such acts as are
strictly official. This was obiter dictum,
however, and does not appear to be
necessarily in conflict with the' opinion
of STROUD, J., in Bellemire vs Bank of

United States, 1 Miles 173, where the
ground intimated in Smedes vs. Utica
Bank, that the bank was not liable because the notary is a public officer, is
strongly disapproved. The point, therefore, appears to be still open, and is
probably not likely to arise often, as the
custom of banks to employ notaries is
universal, and this custom with its i-a
plied authority to employ a sub-agent,
is becoming generally recognised as the
ruling fact in controversies of this kind.
VI. The last question discussed in
the case in hand, is the measure of
damages; in which the courtundoubtedly
adopted the true rule. The delay- in
suing the company, and the attempt to
get the money from the indorsers, had,
as remarked by the court, nothing to do
with the responsibility of the express
company to the plaintiffs. It has, however, been decided, that the company is
not liable for the costs of an action
against the indorsers, the plaintiff having
had an immediate right of action againsi
the company: Downer vs. Madison Co.
Bank, 6 Hil N. Y. 648.
J. T. M.
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Supreme Court of Iowa.
MORRISON VS. SPRIN GER.

THE STATE OF IOWA ex rel. WILSON v8. BURT.
THE STATE OF IOWA ex rel. O'NIELL Vs. WATSON.

The Constitution as applied to the legislative department of the government
is a restriction and not a grant of power: and it is competent for the legislature to prescribe the qualifications of electors and the time, place, and manner
of exercising the elective franchise, when not expressly prohibited from so doing,
or where the prohibition is not implied from some express provision of the Constitution.
Section 1, article 2 of the Constitution of 1857, defines only the qualifications of
an elector, and does not prescribe the place of exercising the elective franchist
as a test of qualification. ' The power to fix the place and manner of its exercis6
is left with the legislature.
The provisions of an act approved September l1th 1862, entitled "An act to
amend Title 4 of the Revision of 1860, so as to enable the qualified electors of
the state in the military service to vote at certain elections, are not inconsistent
with section 1 article 2 of the Constitution of 1857, for the reason that they permit such electors to cast their votes at polls opened and conducted beyond the
limits of the county and the state of which they claim to be residents.
The Supreme Court will declare a law unconstitutional only when it is clearly,
palpably, and plainly inconsistent with the provisions of that instrument.

The first case was appealed from Benton District Court, the
second and third from Clayton District Court.
Springer was declared,'by the Board of Canvassers duly elected
to the office of Clerk of the District Court of Iowa County, at the
October election, 1862. The Hons. James Burt and George Watson were also in like manner declared elected to the offices of
District Judge and Attorney in and for the Ninth Judicial
District, at the same election. Morrison and the relators were
the respective opposing candidates, and instituted these proceedings
to test the right of the several incumbents to said offices. The first
case was commenced under ch. 37 of the. Revision, which relates
to "contesting elections." The two others were "informations"
in the method provided for in ch. 51 of the Revision. On the
hearings below, the first case was decided in favor of the contestant. On the others, the incumbents were successful. As they all
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involve the same question, they will be found considered together
in the opinion.

Martin 4 Murphy, Wieon, O'Neill & Knght, for contestants.
.Fairall&.Boal, Burt & Lyon, Bi8sell &' S iras, for incumbents.
WRIGHT, J.-In the second and third case, it is claimed by the
appellees and incumbents, that the proceedings should have been
instituted under ch. 37 of the Revision, and that as that chapter
prescribes the only method for contesting elections in this state,
the information sliould have been dismissed. Appellants on the
other hand claim that the offices of district judge and attorney are excepted from the provisions of the chapter, or, if not, that they have
a right to pursue either remedy-that is, to be heard before the
tribunal to be organized under said chapter, or by information filed
uider ch. 51. If it shall be determined that the incumbents are
entitled to the offices, the examination of the question here made
will become unnecessary. It is, therefore, passed for the present,
that we may consider the other and cardinal question-:-one that
arises in all the cases. And this involves an inquiry into the
constitutionality of the Act of the General Assembly of this state,
approved September 11, 1862, entitled "An Act to amend title 4
of the Revision of 1860, so as to enable the qualified electors of
this state in the military service to vote at certain elections."
By this act it is declared that every white male citizen of the United
States of the age of twenty-one years, who shall have been a resident of this state six months and of some county therein for sixty
days next preceding his enlisting in the military service of this state
or of the United States, shall be entitled to vote at all elections authorized by law as provided therein, whether at the time of voting
he shall be within the limits of this state or not. It is also provided that a commissioner shall be appointed, to each regiment
of Iowa volunteers, for the purpose of carrying out said act. Such
commissioners are to be sworn, and are required to deliver pollbooks and copies of the law to commanding officers, and to make
suitable provision and arrangement for opening the polls and con-
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ducting the election. A poll is to be opened at every place, whether
within or without the state, where a regiment, battalion, battery,
or dompany, of Iowa soldiers may be found or stationed, at which
all persons may vote who are thereto entitled by law and the provisions of said act-said voting to take place on the day fixed for
holding the general election, to wit: The second Tuesday in October in each year. Provision is made that every regiment and
company on detached service shall have the opportunity of voting.
The electors present are authorized and required to choose from
their number three judges of election, and these judges appoint the
clerks. Each of these officers is required to be sworn. In addition to these provisions, in connection with the act amended (which
is declared applicable), the duties of the officers of elections-the
method of making the returns-the right to administer oaths to
electors-the penalty for false swearing or illegal voting-for a
violation of duty on the part of the commissioner-and all other
matters to make the act effective and have it properly executed,
are clearly, fully, and distinctly pointed out.
It is claimed by the contestants that this act is in conflict with
§ 1, art. 2 of the State Constitution, which reads as follows:
"Every white male citizen of the United States, of the age of
twenty-one years, who shall have been a resident of this state six
months next preceding the election, and of the county in which he
claims his vote sixty days, shall be entitled to vote at all elections,
which are now, or may be, authorized by law."
Other states have passed, or proposed to pass, acts having in
view the same object as the one under consideration. Some of
these are referred to by counsel, and others have been examined
by us, and it will be our first business to see how far they assist the
solution of the questions involved.
The Constitution of Connecticut provides that the place of holding elections, shall be in an electors' meeting, composed of the
electors in the respective towns, qualified to vote in the town, duly
warned, convened, organized, and held fof that purpose. (Constitution of 1818, and amendments of November 1836 and October
1845.) And under this constitution it was held, we think most
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properly, and we may add in an opinion remarkably clear, plain,
and able, that it was intended that the vote should be brought inby
the elector in person, in an organized elector's meeting, in the
presence of the electors, and there received by the presiding officer.
(Opinion by BUTLER, J., 2 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 460.) With the
reasoning of this case, we may have more to do hereafter.
The Constitution of New Hampshire is even more explicit as to
the place of voting, to wit: in an elector's meeting, duly warned
and holden, where the votes of the inhabitants are to be received
in the presence of the selectmen in open meeting. And under this
it was held, that the right of suffrage was to be exercised by the
elector in person, at the meetings duly held for that purpose, and
that this right could not be exercised by or through an agent or attorney in the manner contemplated by a proposed act of the General
Assembly; for the provisions of which and the reasoning of the
judges, see 2 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 140. This conclusion we remark is not only clearly warranted by the Constitution, but by the
common law principle that in all public elections, every vote must be
personally given-a principle which under our form of government
is not only well recognised but of vital practical importance.
The Constitution of Wisconsin (§ 5, art. 13) declares that: " All
persons residing upon the Indian lands within any county of the
state qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under this constitution shall be entitled to vote at the polls which may be held
nearest their residence, for state, United States, or county officers;
provided that no person shall vote for county officers out of the
county in which he resides." Under this it has been held that the
proviso did not mean to prohibit the voter from being allowed to
cast his ballot outside of the county in which he resided, but to
prohibit him from voting for officers of a county in which he did not
reside. See State ex rel. Chandler vs. Main (Manuscript Op. Sup.
Court Wisconsin, March 1863.)
In Pennsylvania, the constitutional provision is that: "In all
elections by the citizens, every white freeman of the age of twentyone years, having resided in this state one year, and in the election
district where he offers to vote ten days immediately preceding

MORRISON vs. SPRINGER.

such election * * * shall enjoy the rights of an elector. ' (Amended
Constitution, § 1, art. 3.) WOODWARD, J., in the case -f Chase vs.
Miller, 2 Am. Law Reg. 146, in what must be admitted to be a
very able and almost exhaustive opinion, holds that the law allowing soldiers to vote outside of the boundaries of the state is in
conflict with this section of the Constitution, and is therefore null
and void.
So far as we k now, these are the only decisions bearing upon the
question now before us. And in view of the constitutional provisions of these several states, we hazard nothing in saying that
neither of them (unless it may be Pennsylvania) are so far analogous to our own, as to make the decision controlling as authority.
In prescribing the time, place, and manner of conducting elections,
the constitutions of the several states differ. "In some," in the
language of the case above cited from Connecticut, " all are prescribed with that particularity which forbids all action by the.
legislature. In others neither are prescribed, but the- qualification required of the voter is fixed, and the power to regulate the
time, place, and manner committed to the legislature." Thus in
Louisiana it is declared that; cc No person shall be allowed to vote
at any election held in this state except in the parish of his residence, and in cities and towns divided into election precincts, in
the election precinct in which he resides." (Const. 1852, Tit. 2,
Art. 13.)
To the same effect is the Constitution of Kentucky, which declares that the elector shall have certain qilalification, and ic shall
vote in said precinct (that of his residence), and not elsewhere."
(Oonst. of 1850, Art. 2, § 8.)
A similar provision is contained in the Constitution of Illinois,
Art. 6, § 1. The Constitution of Michigan (1850, Art. 7, § 1),
Ohio (1851, Art. 5, § 11), and California (1859, Art. 2, § 1), on'
the other hand contain no such express provisions, or restrictions,
and are not so entirely unlike our own.
These brief references to some of the state constitutions but serve
to show how true it is that each state regulates the exercise of the
elective franchise for itself, and that the legislature thereof is left
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more or less free or is more or less restricted by the fundamental
law. We suppose it to be a proposition which will not be denied.
that where the time, place, and manner of holding elections, are not
prescribed by the constitution but committed to the legislature,
the reception of votes out of the precinct or county of the elector's
residence may be constitutionally authorized. It is expressly so held
in the case above cited from Connecticut, and this ruling certainly
accords with the object and purpose of a state constitution and the
powers well understood to be possessed by the legislature-for the
constitution, as applied to the legislative department, is a limitation and not a grant of power. Or, in other words, if the legislature is not restricted, it has full power to provide who shall
have the right of suffrage, and prescribe the time, place, and manner of its exercise-for the legislature clearly has the power to
legislate on all rightful subjects of legislation, unless expressly prohibited from so doing, or where the prohibition is implied from
some express provision. This theory must never be lost sight of
by courts in examining the powers of the legislature. It is elementary, cardinal, and possesses frequently controlling weight in
determining the constitutional validity of their enactments. Where
the prohibition is express, of course there can be no exercise of
power. So where it is necessarily implied from some express
provision, the law-making power cannot interfere.
In either event the constitution is to be taken as a clear and
full mandate, and the legislature cannot change, extend, or control
its meaning. Thus if the constitution declares that a thing shall
be done in a particular manner or way, it is implied necessarily
that it shall not be done in any other. To illustrate, if it declares that the votes of the electors shall be cast at a particular
place, it is not necessary to prohibit by express words their being
cast at any other. But if there is no such express declaration and
none fairly to be implied, it is within the power of the legislature
to fix the place. And this we repeat, upon the principle that the
General Assembly possesses all legislative authority not delegated
to the General Government, or prohibited by the constitution. We
need hardly remark, to avoid misapprehension, that this general
statement of the proposition has no reference to the rights retained
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by the people as contemplated by the last clause of the first article
of the constitution, fo: an exposition of which see The State ex rel.
vs. The County of Wapello, 13 Iowa 888.
In view of these authorities and general principles, what construction shall be given to the provision under consideration ? It
is observable that the constitutions of some of the states, and especially the Western States, contain very different language from
that found in states east and south. Thus, in the states of Connecticut and New Hampshire, a 1 town meeting" is contemplated,
the electors are warned to be present and their votes are to be
cast there in the presence of the selectmen-or, as it is expressed
in the Constitution of Massachusetts, the votes are "to be given
in" at such meeting, to the selectmen so presiding. In most of
the states south, and some of those west, while no " town meetings"
are provided for, it is clearly and expressly declared that the elector shall not be entitled to vote except in the county in which he
may reside at the time of the election. (In addition to those already cited, see Alabama, Art. 3, 585.) In such cases, there
could remain no reasonable room for controversy-for the affirmative words imlly a negative so strongly that the use of negative
words was unnecessary-or in the language of Chancellor KENT,

the means for the.exercise of a power (or right) are so clearly given
or prescribed, that no other or different means could be employed,
(1 Com. 515.)
The constitution of this state is not, however, so explicit. There
is certainly no express provision like that found in Alabama, and
the other states referred to, prohibiting the exercise of the right,
except in the county of the elector's residence. If no express prohibition, is any necessarily implied ?
It is not claimed, nor could it well be, that soldiers in the volunteer service of the Government, by their absence, have' lost or
changed their residence. It still remains, unless changed by some
other act, in the county of their residence at the time of entering
the service. If at home or in the county 9f their residence, on the
day of election, they would unquestionably have the right to vote,
if otherwise qualified. Thus far therefore there is no difficulty.
The inquiry then is, whether the constitution fixes the place of
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voting, (in the county), as a test of qualification-or whether it
gives the qualifications and leaves the place of voting to the legislature.
And the argument is legitimate that as our constitution differs
from those of other states, there was an object in the phraseology
employed. For when it is remembered that very many states had
before 1857, by their constitutions, used such express and clear
language, prohibiting the exercise of the right, out of the county
or precinct of the voter's residence, and that our convention had
the benefit of such provisions and lights, it is fair to presume that
the same or similar language would have been used, if it had been
intended to fix the same qualification. The words of the constitution furnish the test to which the statute is to be brought, and generally all arguments derived from general principles must be addressed to the legislature or the people, and not to us. (21 Penn.
St. R. 162.) And when we find two instruments upon a given
subject-one of which clearly forbids the doing of an act or the
exercise of a power-while, the other contains no such express prohibition, but at the utmost can only be claimed to do so by implication-the fair and legitimate inference is that the words of the latter were not intended to have the same force and effect as the
former. And this is especially true when the latter is made subsequent to and in the light of the former.
But in further examining the very words of the constitution, let
us, if we can, arrive at their meaning. The leading object, undoubtedly, was to define who should be entitled to vote. First-He
must be a white male citizen of the United States. Second-Of the
age of twenty-one years. Third-A resident of this state six
months next preceding the election. Fourth-A resident of the
county sixty days. Now, if it be admitted that the incidents of
residence in the state and county inhere in the voter, in the sense that
sex, age, and color inhere in the person as well as the voter, it by no
means follows, that the legislature might not fix, at its discretion,
the place where those, to whom these incidents attach, or possessing
these qualifications, may exercise the right. For it is admitted
that when the constitution says, "white male citizen," it negatives
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the right of the legislature to confer the elective franchise upon
females or persons of color. So when it prescribes a residence in the
state six months, and the county sixty days, it equally prohibits the
conferring the right upon those having a residence of three months
and twenty days. If nothing was said about residence, it would be
entirely competent for the legislature to fix it, at one day or five
years. But the constitution in the language used, intended to declare who should enjoy the right of suffrage, rather than where it
should be exercised, and the incident of place, or the place of ezercising the right, is not attached as a qualification of the voter.
It is said, however, that he must claim his vote in the county of
his residence, that he cannot vote unless, in the language of the
constitution, he is a resident "of the county in which he claims his
vote," and that this necessariy limits the place of the enjoyment
of the right. The foregoing views to some extent answer this
proposition. But we remark further that the words of the instrument must not be forgotten, added to, or changed. What weight
should be given thei to the word claims? Does the assertion of
this right, or a claim to exercise it, constitute any part of the
qualifications of the voter? In other words, if he is of the'right
age, sex, and color, and has th. requisite residence, is he not a
qualified voter though he may not claim to exercise that right?
If so, then how can the claim of a right, already perfect, add to
its completeness? Or how can the place of asserting it, figure in
the qualifications ? Not only so, hut to claim a thing, is to demand
a right or a supposed right. When the right is asserted, it is
claimed, though it may not be granted. It may be asserted by
words, or by other means. Etymologically, it by no means implies,
that place or presence are essential to its potency or completeness.
On the other hand, to "offer" to do a thing, is to bring to or beforeto present for acceptance or rejection-to exhibit something that
may be taken or received or not. And hence the argument drawn
*from the case in Pennsylvania, is not by any means conclusive.
For while in the language of WOODWARD, J., it may be true that to
"offer" to vote by ballot, is to present one's self, with proper qualifications, at the time and place appointed, and make manual de
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livery of the b ?.:ot, to the officers appointed by law to receive it
-it by no means necessarily follows, that the same would be the
meaning of the word "claims" as used in our constitution. The
one does not imply so conclusively as the other, the idea of a personal presence in order to assert the right. But aside from this,
we must not forget, that the language is not, that the voter must
claim his vote in the county, but in speaking of residence says
that it must be in the county sixty days. And the person cannot
claim to be an elector in any other county than where he has such
residence. This in substance is what is meant by the word "claims."
If more had been meant or intended it seems to us that other and
different language would have been used.
But let us suppose there is doubt as to the correctness of the
above construction-then what is our duty in the premises? The
law has been passed by the legislature, a co-ordinate branch of
the government, acting under like solemn obligations and responsibilities with ourselves-has been approved by the executive, who
has taken a like oath to support the constitution-and we are now
called upon to declare it invalid. If it is so, in our judgment,that is, if we conclude that the infraction is clear, palpable, and
plain-then most unquestionably it is our duty to so declare. On
this subject, no court should seek or desire to escape responsibility.
The constitution should be expounded as it is found, and never
bent or warped to meet any public exigency. All branches of
the government, but courts especially, for the welfare and perpetuity of the government, should carefully and strictly adhere to its
letter and spirit. But while this is all true, while we would, as we
have heretofore done, most unhesitatingly declare invalid any law,
which in our opinion was clearly obnoxious to the provisions of the
constitution-and while we may be permitted to say that we trust
that this power may, in proper cases, be exercised by the courts
fearlessly, independently, yet always wisely, we cannot forget
that among the fundamentals of the law almost is the proposition,
that "we can declare an act void only when it violates.the constitution, clearly, palpably, plainly, and in such manner as to leave
no doubt or hesitation on our minds." (21 Penn. 162.) Lest
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this may be regarded as stating the rule in too strong language
we refer to Adams vs. Hfowe, 14 Mass. 845, where it is said, that
the court when called upon to decide the constitutional validity of
a law, will presume in its favor until the contrary clearly appears:
"so that in any case substantially doubtful, the law would have its
force. * * And the court will never declare a statute void, unless
the nullity and invalidity of the act be placed, in their judgment,
beyond a reasonable doubt." So in Kentucky it is held that if it
be doubtful or questionable whether the legislature has exceeded
its limits, the judiciary cannot interfere, though it may not be satisfied that the act is constitutional. (2 Mon. 178.) And to the
same effect are the following cases, as well as many others: City
of Lexington vs. MeQuillen, 9 Dana 514; Griffith et al. vs. Ohio
Snd. Railroad Co., 20 Ohio (App.) 1; Cooper vs. Telfair, 4 Dallas
14; The, State ex rel. vs. County Judge, 2 Iowa 280; Telfair vs.
Me Gin, I Gray 1; Tylervs. The People, 8 Mich. 833.
In view of this well-settled rule, recognised in the foregoing
cases, we feel entirely satisfied as to our duty in the present case.
There is certainly a substantial doubt. It is certainly true that
we cannot, with conclusive satisfaction place our finger upon the
language of the constitution, which is clearly and palpably violated-(5 Mich. 251)-and though we might not be satisfied of its
constitutionality,-yet if not satisfied of its unconstitutionality, it is
our duty to uphold the law. -And this view we present, because
the law, the power possessed by courts, the whole current of adjudications, the frame work: of our state government, render it emindntly just and sustainable, and with no disposition to shrink from
the discharge of duty. As no court should fail, in a proper case,
to pronounce against the validity of a law, when necessary, neither
should it by metaphysical doubts and difficulties defy and overrule
the public will, by showing that the power exercised by the ldgis.
lature was or might be questionable.
The foregoing considerations dispose of the body of the case.
Other parts of it, or points made, are but arguments adduced to
show the unconstitutionality of the act, the inexpediency of such
legislation, or corollaries from the preceding or main proposition.
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The length of the opinion forbids that we should examine them in
detail.
Briefly we remark, however, that with the expediency of the law
we have nothing to do. It is sufficient that the legislature has
declared this as a part of the public policy of the state.
As to the thought that the convention framing the constitution
never contemplated or "dreamed" of authorizing a ballot to be
taken outside of the state, we refer to what has already been said,
and to the opinion in the Wisconsin case above cited. The argument is there placed in a clear, and to our minds, satisfactory
form, and we could not hope to add to its conclusiveness by further
elaboration.
But it is also urged that the law has an extra-territorial operation-that the laws of a state can only have operation within its
limits, and that as this law provides for the organization of election boards, the holding of an election, the administering of oaths
bey9nd the state, or within the jurisdiction of other tribunals, and
for the punishment of illegal voting and false swearing in such
elections, it is necessarily invalid.
We are not aware that any of the cases cited and relied upon by
counsel intimate that a law of this character would be invalid for
the reason stated. On the contrary, one of themat least (the
Connecticut case), as we have already seen, expressly holds that if
the time, place, and manner are committed to the legislature, the
reception of votes out of the state may be constitutionally authorized.
Not only so, but the law is intended to act upon, and give a rule
for the government of the citizens, residents, or subjects of the
state though they'may be out of the state-upon a subject and in
relation to a matter which concerns and affects them as such citizens or subjects-and which affects alsc the sovereignty of this
state and in no manner concerns any other jurisdiction. That persons violating the law cannot be punished until they come or are
brought, without violation of the rights of another sovereignty,
within the territorial jurisdiction of this state, avails nothing, for,
as is well said by BRONSON, J., in Adams vs. The People, 1 Comstock 178, this is no more than happens when a criminal escapes
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after having committed a crime within the state. Jurisdiction.
of the ofence or subject-matter, is a very different thing. And
upon this subject, see also 1ler vs. Thte People, 7 Mich. 162; 8 Id.
320; 3 Denio 190.
But suppose no penalty was provided for false swearing or
illegal voting-or that those, if any, guilty in these respects
cannot be punished, does it therefore follow that in a proceeding
of this character, we would be justified in declaring the entire act
void? If the legislature, in the general election law, should fail
to provide a penalty for illegal voting, would the result be that
the act should have no operation and that all the votes cast would
be illegal? It seems to us most clearly not. Then again, in what
does such legislation differ from those acts found in all the states,
authorizing the appointment of commissioners abroad to take depositions, acknowledge deeds, and the like; as also the taking of
depositions in other states to be used in our courts? Can those
swearing falsely in such cases, be punished in this state? If not,
is the testimony therefore to be rejected? This has never beeh
the holding of any court, to our knowledge.
Looking therefore, in conclusion, to both the letter and spirit of
the constitution-only anxious to view the question as one of legal
or constitutional right--discarding all thought of expediency-all
considerations touching the justice of the law-as anxious as any
other tribunal, that "a free and honest suffrage" shall alone be
provided for and sustained, keeping in view the great principles
and even lesser rules governing our action, we feel constrained to
say-" in fidelity to the oath we have sworn"-that this law can
be and should be upheld.
The first case is reversed. The other two are affirmed.
The above opinion -of the Supreme
Court of Iowa, just delivered, is yet in
manuscript, and will appear in the 14th
Volume of Iowa Reports. We have before published in the Register the decisions of the Supreme Court of Connecticut. Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire,
holding under their constitutions laws
similar to the one in question to be

unconstitutional. The decision of the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, as well as
that of Iowa, affirms the validity of such
laws. Because different results have
been reached, it does not follow that
there is aiy real conflict in the decisions-the provisions of the state constitutions being more or less dissimilar.
The act of the Iowa Legislature, a
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very brief abstract of which only is above
given, is very full and explicit, and contains many and inost effectual safeguards
against frauds and fraudulent voting.
It is plain, as urged by Air. Justice
WRIGHT, that the General Assembly, unless inhibited by the organic law, may
prescribe the time, place, and manner of
voting, and hence may provide for the
reception of votes outside of the state
limits.
The great, and it is conceived, the
only, material question in the foregoing

case was, whether the constitutional provision cited fixed the place of voting in
the county. Upon an examination of the
provision itself it will be seen that the
question was one of great delicacy and
nicety. It is ably discussed in the foregoing opinion, and after some considerable reflection, while fully appreciating
and freely admitting the grave doubts
which surround it, the writer, if his in.
dividual opinion may be ventured, is not
prepared to say that it was wrongly decided.
J. F. D.

Ditri t Court of the United States--.Ditrict of Massachusetts.
THE CHEROKEE.
It is the duty of the Prize Court to determine what ships shall share in the
proceeds of a prize; but it is the province of the Secretary of the Navy to
ascertain and decide, at least in the first instance, what persons constituted the
officers and crews of such ships and the flag-officer of a squadron, and the share
which each shall receive.
All prizes belong primarily to the Government, and any person claiming to participate therein must show a grant from the Government.
The English prize acts and the decisions under them examined and commented on
at length.
The origin and growth of the doctrine of constructive capture stated.
The English doctrine of constructive capture by association is entirely judiciaj,
has not been uniform, is not well defined or settled, and appears finally to have
been discarded.
The statutes of the United States provide expressly for two classes of ships which
shall share the proceeds of a prize:
(1). Those making the capture;
(2). Those within signal distance of the vessel making the capture.
The statutes of the United States having thus adopted only a portion of the
English doctrine of constructive capture, our courts will not go beyond the
limits thus assigned them.
The United States Prize Acts of 1799, 1800, and 1862 commented on.

No counsel appeared for any party, but suggestions were made
in communications from some of the vessels claiming as joint captors.
VOL. XII.-19
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SPRAGUE, J.-The Steamer Cherokee and cargo were captured
on the 8th of May last by the United States ship-of-war Canandaigua and sent into this port. They have both been condemned.
The question now arises how shall the proceeds be distributed.
It is the duty of this court to determine what ships shall participate in the proceeds of a prize; but it is the province of the
Secretary of the Navy to ascertain and decide, at least in the first
instance, what persons constituted the officers and crews of such
ships and the flag officer of a squadron, and the share which each
shall receive. I mention this because communications have been
received, founded on the erroneous supposition that this court was
to decide upon the claims of individuals as flag officers or otherwise,
and it is desirable that it should be known that such claims must
be presented ,to the Navy Department.
Applications to be allowed to share in this prize have been presented in behalf of the following vessels: New Ironsides, Stettin,
Wamsutta, Flag, Paul Jones, Lodona, Marblehead, Huron, Powhatan, and Housatonic. Some of these applications are quite informal., But I shall treat them all as petitions duly presented.
Since the decree of comdemnation the depositions of one or more
of the officers of each of the above-mentioned ships have been taken.
These have been examined with the other evidence in the case. It
appears that the Canandaigua and the petitioning ships composed the
blockading squadron off Charleston. All excepting the Lodona
were stationed at different places immediately off the city so as to
guard the more direct approaches.
The Lodona was stationed at Bull's Bay, to guard that channel
of communication to Charleston, and was about sixteen miles from
the rest of the squadron.
On the evening of the 5th of May last, the Cherokee ran out
of the port of Charleston. She was first discovered by the steamer
Flag, who fired one or more guns at her, as she was passing by,
a9nd also threw up a: rocket.
She was then discovered by the Canandaigua, a steamer lying
outside of the Flag, which immediately got under way in pursuit.
This was about eleven o'clock at night. The pursuit was continued
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sbout three and a half hours, when the Canandaigua having come
within cannon-range fired a gun, and the Cherokee hove to and Purrendered. The commencement of the chase was s6en by several
of the blockading vessels, but no one of them started in pursuit.
All remained at their anchorage. Both pursuer and pursued were
entirely lost sight of about one hour after the chase began ; and
the place where the capture was actually made was thirty-five miles
from the blockading squadron. No vessel of the squadron was
within signal distance of either the Canandaigua or Cherokee at
the time of the capture.
All prizes made by our ships of war belong primarily to the
United States, and any person who claims to participate therein
must show a grant from the Government.
There have been three Acts of Congress making such grants..
That of 1799, c. 24, that of 1800, c. 33, and that of 1862, c. 204.
The first of these three acts remained in force about a year. Its
provisions are so similar to those of subsequent acts that they need
not be here recited. The fifth section of the Act of 1800 says,
that the proceeds of all ships and vessels, and the goods taken
on board of them, which shall be adjudged good prizes, shall * *. * *

when of inferior force be divided equally between the United States
and - the officers, and men making the capture." The sixth section
provides that " whenever one or more public ships or vessels are in
sight at the time any one or more ships are taking a prize or prizes,
theyshall all share equally in the prize or prizes." The statute
of 1862, sec. 2, copies the first of the foregoing provisions verbatim.
But it does not preserve the phraseology of the second. In section
3 it says, " When one or more vessels of the navy shall be within signal distance of another making a prize, all shall share in the prize."
This appears to be a substitute for the corresponding provision
in the Act of 1800. tut it is unnecessary to consider whether it
be so or not, it being immaterial in the present case whether the
former is superseded by the latter, or whether both may stand and
be enforced together.
These petitioning vessels do not come within either clause. No
one of them was within either sight or signal distance of the Can-
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andaigua, when she was taking this prize. This is not contended
for. They rest their claim wholly upon the fact that they together
with the Canandaigua composed the blockading squadron. Does
that fact bring them within the first provision of the statutes of.
1800 and of 1862, which has already been quoted? The question,
then, is reduced to this: Are the officers and men who were on
board these vessels to be deemed "officers and men making the
capture," within the meaning of the statute ? That the capture
was actually made by the Oanandaigua when and where no other
vessel was in sight or in a condition then to render any aid whatever, is certain.
Those on board other vessels, therefore, were not actual captors.
The question is,-are they to be deemed captors by construction
of law, by reason of their being a part of the blockading squadron ?
If we look only at our own statutes the present question might
be solved without much difficulty. They manifestly provide for
two classes of ships,First, those making the capture;
Second, thQse within signal distance of a vessel making a capture.
The second section of the Act of 1862 gives one-half to the
"4officers and men making the capture." The third section gives a
share to any vessel of the navy which " is within signal distance of
another making a prize."
Thus the statute in the first -place gives half of the prize to those
making the capture, and then provides that another class shall share
with them, viz., vessels not themselves making the prize, but within
signal distance of those that do make it. From this it seems clear
that the first -class are those who actually make the capture, and
that none others can participate except those provided for in the
second class,
This construction would be adopted without hesitation were it
not for certain English doctrines which have been supposed by some
to have a direct and even controlling application to our law.
It becomes necessary to bestow some attention upon the decisions
in which those doctrines are to be found.
It must be borne in mind that we are not discussing a question
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of general jurisprudence, or endeavoring to ascertain a rule-of the
unwritten law to be determined by judicial precedents or considerations of justice and policy. But we are endeavoring to ascertain
the true meaning and intent of a positive legislative enactment.
Of course we do not look to British decisions for any direct exposition of our own statutes, to which they can, at most, have but an
indirect application.
Those decisions are under the English prize acts; that is, they
give construction to their own positive enactments. Now, if the
language which describes those who are to share in the prize be
the same in our statute as in the British, then English decisions
may have some application.
If such language of the British statute had received a judicial
interpretation and had thus acquired a settled and well-known
meaning, and our legislature then adopted the same language, it may
well be supposed that they intended it should bear the same interpretation. We must therefore endeavor to ascertain what was the
provision of the British statutes, and how far there haa been any
settled and well known construction thereof at the times when our
statutes were passed.
The prize acts of 6th Anne, c. 16, and of 43d George III., c.
160, and 45th George III., c. 72, 55th George III., c. 160, give
the prize to the officers and crew by whom it "shall be taken."
There was a prize act in 83 George the III. which is noticed as
expired but not printed in the British Statutes at Large. There can
be no doubt however that it gave the prize to those who should
take it, for in the year 1799 Sir WILLIAM SCOTT in the case of The
Vryheid, 2 Rob. 21, says, " The Act of Parliament and the proclamation give the benefit of prize to the takers."
In the corresponding provision in our prize acts, instead of the
word " take," the word " capture," is used. I do not think that
there is any difference in the import of these t'o words in the
connection in which they are used, and I proceed to consider the
effect of the British interpretation of their statutes in the same
manner as if our own had in this first provision adopted their language without the change of a word.
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In construing their prize acts the English courts have divided
the takers or captors into two classes,-the actual captors, and the
constructive captors.
As to who should be deemed actual captors, there seems to have
been little question. But there has been much doubt and difficulty
in determining who should be permitted to share as constructive
captors. Judicial decisions have admitted two classes of king's
ships. The first is those in sight at the time of the capture. This
rule of construction doubtless grew out of the difficulty of defining
the limits of actual assistance by joint action or co-operation. If
two ships were engaged in the combat with the enemy, it is manifest
that both actually contributed to the result. So where several
vessels place themselves in such positions and proximity to an
enemy's ship.that she cannot escape, and she strikes without resistance because resistance to such numbers would be useless, it is
manifest that all are at the time directly instrumental in effecting
the result. Then come cases of ships being present, or within
sight, at a greater or less distance from the actual captor, creating
doubts whether they gave efficient aid or contributed in any and
to what degree to the capture, which doubts it would be impossible
satisfactorily to solve; and to avoid them and the litigation and
uncertainty which would attend each of the numerous cases that
might arise, the courts adopted a general rule that a king's ship
being in sight, should constitute her a joint captor by construction
of law, upon the ground that it must be presumed that the actual
captor was thereby encouraged, and that the enemy was intimidated.
The rule required that she should be in sight not only of the capturing ship, but also of the enemy. There were some exceptions:
The Robert, 3 Rob. 195.
The doctrine that a king's ship being in sight entitled her to
share in the prize, was firmly established. This rule had .the
advantage of being well defined and of resting on an intelligible
reason.
A second class of constructive captors .has been introduced by
judicial decisions. They are those who, not being in sight at the
time of the capture, are nevertheless permitted to share in the
prize by reason of some association with the actual captor.
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These ;etitioners claim to come within this class, by reason of
their being associated with the Canandaigua in the same blockading
squadron. It becomes necessary, therefore, to inquire how far,
at the several times when our respective prize acts were passed,
there was any settled and well-known construction by which such
association conferred the rights of constructive joint captors. Ou
earliest prize act was in 1799. That, as already stated, has been
repealed. The next was in 1800-what was the state of the British
adjudications at that time ?-There is no doubt that they recognised
two classes of captors. one, the actual, and the other, the constructive, and that they had determined that a vessel in sight at
the time of the capture. should share in the prize as constructive
captor. But the question is, how far had thv doctrine of association been then established. There were, doubtless, many decisions
before that time, but for the want of trustworthy reports, our means
of ascertaining what they were are very imperfect. We have to
rely mainly upon such glimpses as we obtain from fragmentary
statements made by the court or counsel in the trial of subsequent
cases. Of the earlier cases thus referred to, the one. most in point
is The Mars, decided by the Lords 1790, and cited in The Vryheid,
2 Rob. 22. It i.thus stated in a note :-, This was a case of a
French ship taken by one of three king's ships, which, being apprised of the design of the enemy to escape from Port au Prince,
had taken their station at different outlets to interceptr them. The
capture was made by one ship. A claim, was given on behalf of
the other two, to share as joint captors, though not present at the
capture; but it was rejected."
In 1800, the knowledge of previous decisions seems to have
rested in a great degree upon tradition or upon the recollection of
the judges and counsel who had been engaged in the trials. We
learn something of the state of the law in 1799, by what is said by Sir
WILLIAM SCOTT, in The Vryheid. After remarking that that was
a case of joint capture, that is, a claim to participate as constructive
captors, he says: "The court has to lament that cases of this
nature are, in general, attended with much. difficulty, as they
depend frequently on very minute facts, on which the court has to
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decide between contradictory representations, and it is to be re.
gretted that the decisions of the courts on this subject have not
always been so uniform as it is highly desirable they should be."
Again, on page 23, he says: - The being in sight, generally, and
with some few exceptions, has been so often held to be sufficient to
entitle parties to be admitted joint captors, that Where that fact is
alleged, we do not call for particular cases to authorize the claim;
but where that circumstance is wanting it is incumbent on the party
to Inake out his claim by an appeal to decided cases, or at least,
to principles which are fairly to be extracted from those cases."
There does not appear to have been any decision inconsistent
with that in TI're Mar8, much less, any one that could control it;
and it cannot be said that in the year 1800 the English courts extended the doctrine of constructive capture by association to cases
of blockade, much less that there was any such settled and well
known rule in that respect as to create a presumption that Congress
intendcd to adopt it, even if they had copied the provisions of the
British statute. In such case it might have been inferred that
they were satisfied with the decisions that had been made in regard
to ships in sight and approved of the rule thus adopted. But their
intention in this respect was not left to inference. They introduced
a new provision giving to ships in sight the rights of joint captors,
thus expressly declaring how far they intended to adopt the doctrine
of constructive capture, and repelling the presumption that they
intended to sanction it in other cases.
But it has been said, that previous to the passing of our prize
act in 1862, the doctrine of constructive capture by association had
been fully established by judicial decisions, and especially in case
of blockade.
There have been no such decisions in this country. No such
construction, therefore, had been given to our own statutes. All
the adjudications relied upon, were made in England in giving a
construction to their own prize acts. Those decisions require some
attention.
The case of The JTryheid, which was decided in 1799, has already
been referred to. The claim of a ship to share in a prize made by
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a fleet, of which she had been a part, was rejected upon the ground
that she had been temporarily detached upon a separate service
before the chase began. There are subsequent decisions to the
same effect. See The Trinidad, 5 Rob. 86.
In T/e Porsighleid, 3 Rob. 315, 316, the ship of war Director,
being one of the fleet which was blockading the Texel, was sent to
look out, and while out of -sight of the rest of the fleet, made the
capture. " The captured ships were not seen by the fleet till they
were in the possession of the actual captor." Sir WILLIAM SCOTT
decided that the whole fleet was entitled to share in the prize.
This decision was on the 17th of Juie 1801.
On the same day in another case, The .rarmonie, 3 Rob. 318,
it appeared " that the Scorpion and the Fox were sent by Captain
McDougal, commander of a squadron employed in the blockade of
the Texel, as small vessels that drew less water, to cruise for the
purpose of keeping up the blockade nearer in upon the coast,
where large ships could not safely venture on account of the shoals.
It was admitted that the capture was made'ten leagues from the
fleet, after a chase of three or four hours and completely. out of
sight."

Sir WILLIAM SCOTT held that the fleet were constructive

joint captors.
In The Genereux, decided by the Lords in 1803, referred to by
the court and counsel in The Guillaume Tell, Edw. 9, 16, the
capture was made by the Foudroyant and two other ships. The
Lion claimed to be admitted as joint captor. It appears that they
all belonged to a squadron under command of Lord Keith, who,
having received information that a French squadron consisting of
four ships was on the way for the relief of the French garrison at
La Valette, immediately made such disposition of his ships as would
be most likely to intercept them. "cThe Foudroyant and two other
ships of the line were ordered to look out for the enemy in the
S. S. E., and the Lion was ordered to take a station off the passage
between Gaza and Malta," and the rest of the vessels were
stationed in another place or places to prevent the enemy from
entering La Valette. The Foudroyant and the two vessels with
her fell in with the enemy and captured the Genereux on that side
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of the island which is opposite to La Valette. At the time of the
tapture the Lion was sufficiently near to hear the report of the
guns during the engagement. The Lion and the other stationed
ships formed a part of the same squadron with the Foudroyant
and her two associates. All were under the same commander, and
took their respective stations by his order to intercept the enemy.
Such were the allegations in behalf of the Lion. The court held
that the allegations were insufficient, that is, that if all the facts
thus alleged were true, still the Lion was not entitled to share
because she was not in sight at the time of the capture. In The
Guztlaume Tell, decided in 1808, Edw. 6, the Northumberland
and Culloden were part of a squadron blockading the port of La
Valette, in which were known to be two French ships of war.
The capture of these ships was a special object of the squadron,
they having also the general purpose of preventing the escape of
other vessels and taking the place.
One of them attempted to escape in the night, was pursued and
captured by some of the fleet. The petitioning vessels had taken
an active part in the preconcerted measures to prevent the escape,
but did not join in the pursuit, nor leave their anchorage. It does
not clearly appear, from the statement of facts by the reporter,
whether the capture was made within sight of the petitioning. vessels
or not.
Sir WILLIAM SCOTT, at the close of his judgment, states the
grounds upon which it rested, as follows :-,Now, in this case. there
was not only an actual sight; not only a perfect conusance of what
was going forward, but as complete and uniform and persevering
an association in this particular object, as well as in the general
objects of the blockade, as can be imagined. I am therefore of
opinion, that the Culloden and Northumberland are entitled to
share." It is to be observed that the judge states, as a material
circumstance, that these vessels were in sight. I do not think
that it is to be inferred that they were in sight at the time of capture, but only at the beginning of the chase, and this, I suppose,
was relied upon to distinguish it from The aenereux. There is
another circumstance which is emphatically dwelt upon by the
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judge. It is that the vessels of the squadron were associated not
only in the general object of a blockade, that is to prevent the
ingress or egress of any vessels, but in the special purpose of preventing this French ship of war from escaping. After having
spoken of these ships as being part of a squadron associated for
the express purpose of making the capture, he says: ,The whole
fleet were acting with one common consent, upon a preconcerted
plan for the capture of this prize ;" and again, in the quotation
before made from the concluding part of his opinion, we notice this
explicit language: " There was .... as complete and uniform and
persevering an association in this particular object, as well as in
the general objects of the blockade, as can be imagined."'
From this it would seem that under the pressure of the authority
of The aenereux, the learned judge no longer insisted upon the
doctrine which he had laid down in The Forsigheid in the year
1801. But in 1809, that case came again before him, after proof
had been taken to support the allegations which he had admitted,
and he then reaffirmed his former decision-using the following
language: cc Upon the principle which I laid down upon the admission of the allegation, I am bound to pronounce that the whole fleet
must be entitled as joint captors." Edw. Rep. 127.
In Le Bon Adventure, decided in 1810 by the Lords (1 Acton
239), Sir WILLIAm GRANT, in delivering the opinion of the court,
states the question to be ",whether a vessel commencing a second
chase, in sight of a fleet of which she had constituted a part before
she had been detached, by signal, upon a former chase, and capturing the second chase at any distance from such a fleet, would
necessarily, upon ihis principle, be compelled to let in the claim
of the whole fleet, to share in a prize so made, notwithstanding
1 From this judgment it would be inferred that merely being part of blockading

squadron to prevent the egress of all vessels, without the special object of capturing that ship, or preconcerted measures for that particular purpose, would not
have entitled the ships which remained at anchor to participate with those who
pursued and capture'd, nor that being associated both for that special purpose and
the general object of the blockade would have been sufficient without at some

time being in sight.
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such fleet afforded no assistance or co-operation in the capture,
but actually bore away from the captor on another tack." He
declared that no such principle had ever been recognised, and the
claim of the fleet was rejected. But in 2The .Empres8, decided by
Sir WILLIAM SCOTT, in 1814, (1 Dod. 368), the ship of war Beagle,
while pursuing an enemy's vessel, discovered another ship of war,
the Rover, also in chase of her. Both continued the pursuit for
some time, when a second enemy's vessel hove in sight. Thereupon
the captain of the Beagle, being the superior officer, ordered the
Rover to discontinue the pursuit of the first and pursue the second
enemy. She did so, and after continuing the chase for ten hours,
and until out of sight of the Beagle, made the capture. The
Beagle was admitted to share in the prize by reason of the alleged
association; although her meeting the Rover on the ocean was
accidental, and she had continued her course without pause or
deviation in pursuit of the first enemy's ship, and had afforded no
assistance or co-operation in the capture, but. actually bore away
from the captor. It is not easy to see how the officers and crew
of the Beagle could be deemed to have taken the second enemy's
ship when they were, all the time, sailing for another object, in a
different direction until out of sight, and did not even know of the
capture until some time afterwards.
The L'EtoiTe, 2 Dod. 107, does not go so far as The .Empress.
In The Naples Grant,2 Dod. 277, it is held as a general rule that
in order to confer a right to share in a prize upon a vessel .which
is engaged in the common service in a blockade, or in naval or
military operations of that kind, it must be shown that such vessel
was present at some period of the operation; either at the commencement, the intermediate stage, or at the time of the surrender.
It is added that this rule may not be without exceptions.
In The Nodstern, decided in 1809, by the Lords (1 Acton 140),
the court say "upon this we are decidedly of opinion, that it is
not sufficient that a joint enterprise shall exist at the time, excer,
it expressly refer to the capture in question; or, in other words,
that the capture grew out of the purpose and object for which the
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parties have been united, and be the joint produce of an actual
co-operation and the object of union." This language, especially
the concluding sentence, and the decisions in The Har8 and The
Genereux, indicate a disposition in the appellate tribunal, not to go
beyond the line of actual joint capture. The courts have undoubtedly in many cases gone beyond this line, but their decisions
have not been uniform, and to what extent they mean to carry the
doctrine of constructive capture by association, is left in doubt.
Looking at the adjudications of both the superior and subordinate
courts, it cannot be said that they present any settled and welldefined rule. Indeed the whole course of the decisions in favor
of constructive joint capture is most remarkable. Their only
foundation is the express language of the statute. And their
only legitimate authority is to give a just construction to that language. Yet, except in the case of The rryheid, decided in 1799,
we find no reference whatever to any statute. We look in vaiD
not only for the terms of any act of parliament, but for any remark
which indicates that any such act existed. The claims of captors
are discussed not as resting upon express grant, but as if they were
questions of common law, depending merely upon previous decisions
and general considerations of justice and policy.
In 'The lryheid, p. 21, Sir WILLIAM SCOTT says. that by the
word " takers" in the act of parliament, are naturally to be understood those who actually take possession or those affording an ac-

tual contribution of endeavor to that event; either of these persons
are naturally included under the denomination of takers; but the
courts of law have gone further, and have extended the term
"taker" to another description of persons-to those, who, not
having contributed actual service, are still supposed to have rendered a constructive assistance. Thus distinctly admitting that the
courts had gone beyond the natural import of the statute. In a
subsequent case, The Financier, 1 Dod. 67, the same learned
judge says, " The admission of a constructive captor to share with
an actual captor is, in itself, an indulgent construction of the law,
which must not be further extended." Thus it appears that the
constructive captor comes in by the indulgence of the court and not
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by the natural construction of the statute grant. In reading many
of the decisions it is evident that the courts, following their own
views of policy or expediency, have indulged in a latitude of construction which has carried them out of sight of the text which they
were supposed to be expounding.
That the decisions had gone beyond the just interpretation of
the terms of the grant is not unfrequently admitted by the courts
themselves.
Besides the remarks already quoted, Sir WILLIAM SCOTT in The
T
ryheid, p. 22, after having stated that the act of parliament gave
the prize " to the takers," says: "For, as the word has already
travelled a considerable way beyond the meaning of the act of parliament, the disposition of the court will lean, not to extend it still
farther, but to narrow it, and bring it nearer to the terms of the
act than has been donie in some former cases." 'In The Odin, 4
Rob. 325, the court says: " The principle of constructive assistance
has been altogether thought to have been carried somewhat far."
In La'Fsrieuse Stew. 179, the court says "'that, as a general
principle, it has been the object and intention of the Courts of Vice
Admiralty to harrow rather than to extend the interest of joint captures, and to confine as much as possible the benefit of prize to
such vessels as are the real and actual captors."
In Le Nimen, 1 Dod. 16, it is said by the court: ,It certainly
is not at this time of day the disposition of the court to extend the
limits of joint capture."
In The Arthur, 1 Dod.. 426, it is said, "the principle of association has not been of late favored either here or in the Court of
Appeals." This was in the year 1814.
In L'Etoile, 2 Dod. 107, the court says "there was an actual
engagement between the Sparrow and the enemy, and this circumstance does, I think, discharge the legal prejudice which prevails against a constructive joint captor." This was in the year
1816, after the termination of the-wars which grew out of the French
Revolution and the reign of Napoleon I. Thus it appears that a
"legal prejudice," that is, a prejudice by the legal profession,
then prevailed against constructive joint captors. Since that time
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there have beeni no decisions upon that subject which have come to
my knowledge.
At the commencemint of the Russian war, in March 1854, the
Queen, by proclamation, granted the proceeds of prizes to the
takers, and prescribed the manner in which they should be divided.
That proclamation contained the following clause: -Ships oi
vessels, being in sight of the prize, as also of the captor, undei
circumstances to cause intimidation to the enemy and encourage.
ment to the captor, shall be alone entitled to share as joint captors."
In June following, a prize act was passed by parliament. It did
not contain this clause respecting vessels being in sight, and it haa,
been suggested that such omission is to be regarded as a disapproval
of it. But it is to be observed that the preamble refers to the proclamation as a grant made by royal munificence to the captors, and
the act repeats the grant, but makes no distribution of the proceeds
of prizes, but expressly confirms the division which had been made
by the proclamation. From this the fair inference is that parliament deemed the clause giving vessels in sight a right to share and
none others, to be a part of the rules of. division, and that it was
not the intention of the legislature in any degree to change what
they have recognised as a rightful grant by royal. munificence.
If this be so, then the doctrine of constructive capture by association has been discarded both by the advisers of the Crown aid by
the parliament.
If it should be thought by any one that the omission of that
clause in the act of parliament is to be regarded as a disapproval
of it, then it would exhibit the same want of accord between the
executive and legislative departments, and the same unsettled and
unsatisfied state of mind, as previously existed in the courts and
the legal profession.
From the foregoing review it appears that the judicial doctrine
of constructive capture by association has not been uniform, and
is not well defined-and well settled. It has encountered the decided disapprobation of the profession, and the courts have not unfrequently indicated that it was not satisfactory even to them-
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selves, and seems finally to have been discarded by royal procla.
mation. It is by no means commended to our understanding as
founded on sound principles of interpretation.
I do not think that it could be rationally presumed that Congress
intended to adopt it by their act of 1862, even if the provisions
of that act were the same throughout as those of the British acts.
But they are not the same. Our statute contains a new and.
highly important provision. The 3d section says, that " when one
or more vessels of the navy shall be within signal distance of another
making a prize, all shall share in the prize." It is contended, on
the side of these petitioners, that Congress did not intend merely
to follow our prize act of 1800, but that they must have known
and had in view the British doctrine and decisions. Assuming that
to be so, then they knew that one part of the doctrine of constructiva %apturewas well defined and well settled upon rational ground,
while another part .was not well defined and was not sustained by
uniformity of decision or just principles of construction, and had
been discountenanced by the profession.
Thereupon they expressly adopt the first part, but do not so
adopt the second.
Does not this clearly show that they did not intend to leave it
.o the courts to determine how far the doctrine of constructive capture should be deemed or made a part of our law, but chose to determine it themselves and fix the limits by express enactment?
And, having so introduced the first part of such doctrine and not
the second, must we not. infer that they did not intend to adopt
both?
Is it not a case for the application of the maxim exprem8io uniu8
eqt exclusio alterius, especially as we see good reason both for the
aloption of the one and the exclusion of the other? There is
another view. By our statutes there are two classes of ships and
two classes only which are to participate in the prize. The first
are those who make the capture, or, in other words, those making
the prize. The second class, are those within signal distance of
one of the first class. The language is any ship within signal
distance of another making a prize. If then one of a blockading
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squadron comes within the first class and is a vessel making a prizp
within the meaning of the statute, then any vessel that is within
signal distance of her is one of the second class and entitled to
share by the express words of the statute, and the result would be
that a ship of a blockading squadron lying at anchor and not herself being within signal distance of another making a prize, and
having no knowledge of the capture until some time after it was
effected, will not only share herself but bring in another vessel not
associated in the blockade, but which merely happened to be within
signal distance of her at the time when a capture was made, of
which both were wholly ignorant. This is an absurdity which no
one can believe the legislature intended. It may be asked why
did not the same result follow from the English decisions. The
answer is, that the whole doctrine of constructive capture was the
creature of the courts, and in their hands all its parts were flexible.
They moulded it at pleasure by limitations or alterations according
to their views of expediency. They did not build construction
upon construction. Thus where a ship became a constructive
captor by being in.sight they did not permit one associated with
her but not in sight to be a captor by construction, although it was
by obeying an order to pick up the boats of the first that she was
prevented from being'also in sight. (The Financier; 1 Dod. 67.)
But our legislature having provided that one class of those who
had been decreed constructive captors shall be entitled to share,
and -thus given them an express statute right, if the court shall
introduce another class of constructive captors and hold that they
are 4c ships making the prize," within the meaning of the statute,
then the result which has already been stated will follow. This,
as we have seen, Congress could not have intended. Their first
class of grantees, therefore, can embrace only actual captors; and
this conclusion is in accordance with a fair and natural import of
their language.
The result is that no vessel is entitled to share with the
Canandaigua.
We are indebted to the courtesy of the for the District of Massachusetts, the
District Attorney of the United States Hon. Richard H. Dana, Jr., for the foreVOL. XII.-20

